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ABSTRACT
Asset-backed securities represent one of the largest and fastest growing financial markets. Under
securitization, agents perform functions (for fees) that would alternatively be performed by a
vertically integrated lender with ownership of a whole loan. We examine how outsourcing impacts
performance using data on 357 commercial mortgage-backed securities deals with over 46,000
individual loans. To alleviate agency conflicts in managing troubled loans, underwriters often sell
the first-loss position to the special servicer, the party who is charged with handling delinquencies
and  defaults.  When  holding  the  first-loss  position,  special  servicers  appear  to  behave  more
efficiently, making fewer costly transfers of delinquent loans to special servicing, but liquidating a
higher percentage of loans that are referred to special servicing. Special servicers are also more likely
to own the first loss position in deals that require additional effort (deals with higher delinquencies).
Market pricing reflects the existence of agency costs. Despite the apparent reduction of agency costs,
the first-loss position is increasingly owned by a party other than the special servicer. We pose a
number of explanations, including conflicts between junior and senior securities holders (the asset
substitution problem) and risk aversion among special servicers. Consistent with asset substitution,
we show that special servicers delay liquidation when they hold the first-loss position in deals with
more severe delinquency problems.
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Asset-backed securities are one of the most important financial innovations in recent decades.  
According to the Federal Reserve, as of the end of 2005, the value of outstanding of mortgage- 
and other asset-backed securities was $6.7 trillion, about $1.7 trillion larger than outstanding 
amount of non-ABS corporate bonds.  About one-half of mortgages, one-third of trade 
receivables, and one-fourth of consumer credit are securitized in the US.
1  The asset-backed 
securities (ABS) market has developed along many dimensions.  Once dominated by residential 
mortgages, this market now includes securities backed by loans on cars, manufactured homes, 
credit cards, trade receivables, commercial real estate, leases, franchise debt, student loans, and 
even securities from previous securitizations (CDOs). 
In a typical securitization, a large numbers of assets are grouped together in a single pool.  
Claims to the cash flows from the pooled loans are sold as securities, where the economic claims 
to cash flows are divided (or “tranched”) based on a strict priority system.  Parties pay a 
premium to buy the most senior tranches, whose capital is protected by the existence of more 
junior securities that absorb initial losses.  This structure is similar to that of dividing up claims 
to a firm’s cash flows between equity holders, junior creditors, and senior creditors.  Equity 
holders are paid only after the claims of all the creditors are satisfied.  If the firm’s assets do not 
generate enough cash flow to pay-off its debt, the equity position is wiped out.  Similarly, senior 
creditors are paid in full before junior creditors receive any cash flow.  Some securitizations may 
have as many as twenty separate tranches in their capital structure.
  
The growth of ABS has resulted from a series of economic, legal, and regulatory developments.  
ABS are publicly-traded and rated by independent rating agencies, resulting in the generation of 
                                                 
1 Flow of Fund Tables L1, L4, L125, L126, L212, for 4Q, 2005, Federal Reserve Board, released March 9, 2006. 2   
a great deal of public information about the performance and valuation of the underlying assets 
and the traded securities.  Regulators give insurance companies highly preferential capital 
treatment when they hold investment grade ABS instead of less transparent whole loans.
2  The 
legal system also provides relatively strict protection for the cash flow priorities inherent in the 
bankruptcy-remote entities that are a fundamental part of securitization.
 3  In addition, the 
creation of a wide variety of claims to debt securities has helped to complete capital markets, 
allowing investors to purchase positions all along the risk/return frontier.
4  Specialized parties 
have emerged to perform many functions that were previously performed by vertically integrated 
lenders, possibly allowing for increased efficiency and specialization.  Finally, ABS are typically 
more liquid than whole loans. 
Yet securitization also creates important (and previously unexplored) organizational costs 
associated with the separation of ownership and control of assets and the parsing of equity 
interests into a large number of relatively thin ownership tranches.  Traditionally, a bank or an 
insurance company would own and manage all of the loans it originated, collecting payments 
and making all decisions in the event of delinquency and default.
5  With securitization, a third-
party (the special servicer) takes over responsibility for managing troubled loans.  Special 
servicers usually receive a fixed fee for monitoring the entire pool of loans, plus a percentage of 
the outstanding balance of any loans that are in special servicing.  These fees are paid before 
investors receive the proceeds from a workout or foreclosure of a troubled loan.   
                                                 
2 See Kopcke (1996), for example.  Previous papers reject the hypothesis that securitization has grown purely due to 
regulatory arbitrage in residential mortgages (Ambrose et. al. 2006) and credit cards (Calomiris and Mason 2004).  
3 Ayotte and Gaon (2005) point out that strict payout rules are obscured in bankruptcy, but that the bankruptcy 
remote structure used in ABS typically ensures that the strict prioritization of cash flows holds for financial firms. 
4 Gaur, et., al, (2003) for a further discussion of pricing securities in incomplete markets. 
5 For larger loans, a lender might syndicate a portion of a loan to multiple parties, but retain control of servicing.  Of 
course, problems might still arise when originators sell loans to less-informed parties.  (See Ciochetti, et. al. 2003)   3   
Of course, fee-based special servicers may not always behave in the best interest of the investors.  
To better align the interests of the special servicers and investors, special servicers sometimes 
hold the first loss position (the so-called the “B-piece”), which is the residual claimant in a 
securitization.  The procedure of having the special servicer own the first loss position is 
intended to ensure that the special servicer exerts optimal effort in maximizing the value of the 
collateral.  The fees and losses attributable to the most problematic loans as well as the benefits 
from effective loan management come from the pockets of the B-piece holder. 
Yet such arrangements create a new set of conflicts.  First, special servicers may be risk averse 
and require additional compensation for bearing the risk of holding the first-loss position in 
every deal.
6  In addition, special servicers face the classic asset substitution problem associated 
with equity holders in highly leveraged firms.  The first-loss position often represents three 
percent or less of the entire ABS capital structure.  When an increasing number of loans in a 
securitization face potential losses, special servicers have an incentive to extend loans or take 
other risks as the value of their equity position falls.  This is analogous to the decisions made by 
savings and loan executives to extend loans when large losses on real estate loans impaired their 
capital in the late 1980s.   
Yet, with less than three percent ownership in a deal, special servicers often have the equivalent 
of less capital than S&Ls held prior to the downturn of the late 1980s.  Some commentators have 
expressed concern with the rapid growth in ABS and the lack of previous experience with a large 
number of defaults.  They have worried that the ABS structure might perform less efficiently 
                                                 
6 Typically, special servicers must maintain an investment grade rating or face possible removal.  Such a rating 
requires a lot of costly capital when holding a concentrated loss position across many deals, especially as it is 
virtually impossible to hedge these securities.   4   
than banks in handling troubled loans, potentially slowing the recovery of the economy from a 
recession.   
We examine the performance of securitizations utilizing data on 357 commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) deals with over 46,000 individual loans.  Previous papers examine 
default and prepayment decisions without accounting for these conflicts of interest.
7    
We demonstrate the existence of appreciable principal-agent conflicts in the securitization 
process.  Special servicers appear to put additional effort into identifying and efficiently 
managing the most troubled loans when they own the first-loss position.  Special servicers are up 
to 14 percent less likely to transfer a delinquent loan to special servicing in deals where they hold 
the B-piece.  Conditional on special servicing, special servicers are five percent more likely to 
foreclose and liquidate a loan when they own the B-piece.  These results hold when we include 
fixed effects for individual special servicers, suggesting that special servicers have a different 
evaluation process for deals based on whether they own the first loss position.
8  We also address 
the possibility that experienced special servicers might choose to hold the B-piece only in deals 
with high quality loans.  In fact, the opposite is the case.  Deals in which the special servicer 
owns the B-piece experience worse delinquency and default behavior, conditional on observable 
loan characteristics.  These findings suggest that CMBS underwriters are well-informed about 
ex-ante loan quality and use high-powered incentives when the marginal returns to incentive 
alignment are strongest.  
                                                 
7 See Ambrose and Sanders (2003), Chen and Deng (2003), and Deng et. al (2004).  Other work examines loan 
default, or subordination levels (Downing and Wallace 2005).  
8 One industry participant conceded to the authors that some servicers used the “A” team on deals in which they 
owned the first-loss position, but the “B” team on deals in which they received only fees. 5   
Evidence from initial bond prices for CMBS securities also supports our agency cost 
interpretation.  Prices are higher (yields are lower) for junior securities in deals in which the 
special servicer owns the first-loss position, even though these deals have worse delinquency 
experiences.  Junior securities are the most likely to be positively impacted by superior 
performance of the special servicer.  Spreads on the most senior (investment-grade) securities 
appear unaffected by the ownership of the B-piece, which is consistent with the view that such 
securities are rarely impacted by losses from defaults. 
Despite the seemingly important alignment of interests, the special servicer does not own the B-
piece in more than one-third of all CMBS securitizations in our data, a percentage that has grown 
over time.  We suggest two possible reasons.  Risk aversion among special servicers may play a 
role.  Special servicers own the B-piece in a smaller percentage of deals when total issuance of 
CMBS securities is highest.  We also find evidence of conflicts of interest between equity 
holders and creditors (asset substitution).  In deals with higher delinquencies, special servicers 
who own the B-piece appear to slow the foreclosure process for loans in special servicing.  This 
pattern suggests that special servicers may be susceptible to the same kinds of problems that 
characterized undercapitalized banks when losses rose.   
 
I.   Theory and predictions 
Securitization accentuates agency conflicts resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control of assets.  The discussion of managerial incentive problems dates back as far back as 
Adam Smith’s “The Wealth of Nations.”  Articles such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Harris 
and Raviv (1978), and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that, even with elaborate (and costly) 6   
contracts between managers and shareholders.  Other market mechanisms such as the threat of 
takeover and “ex-post settling up” do not fully discipline managers (Fama 1980).  Laffont and 
Martimort (2002) discuss these issues extensively. 
Information asymmetries are a second important factor impacting the benefits of securitization 
and the liquidity of loans as an alternative vehicle for hedging risk.  Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) 
show that contract mechanisms such as implicit guarantees or partial sales of loans can mitigate 
moral hazard problems in which lenders do not exert enough effort investigating the risk 
associated with loans that they intend to sell.  In a similar vein, DeMarzo (2005) argues that 
securitization allows sophisticated intermediaries with special skills in valuing assets to mitigate 
the “lemons” problem when selling assets to the market.  However, for many securitizations, 
including the CMBS we examine in this paper, these mechanisms do not appear to operate.  
Originators and underwriters almost never hold the risks from loan failures once securities have 
been issued, possibly due to regulatory capital rules.
9  Neither paper examines the incentive 
misalignment between investors and managers once securitizations are created. 
In the face of unobservable effort by managers and asymmetric information about the firm’s 
prospects, shareholders cannot obtain the first-best outcome for the firm.  Similar problems exist 
in most securitizations.  While junior security holders (who are equivalent to equity holders in a 
corporation) have the right to choose and change the special servicer, they often lack the ability 
to monitor managerial effort and deal quality.  In the face of principal-agent conflicts, high-
powered (outcome-based) compensation can often provide better incentives for the agent 
(Eisenhardt 1989).  However, if agents are more risk averse than the principals and their actions 
                                                 
9 Often, the servicer can require the originator and/or the underwriter to repurchase loans in the case of material 
misrepresentations of loan information.  However, this is a very strict standard that is rarely used.  7   
are not observable and verifiable, such high-powered compensation will not obtain the first-best 
outcome (Shavell, 1979). 
Special servicers may well be more risk averse than other potential investors in low-rated CMBS 
tranches and have a lower willingness to pay than outside investors for the B-piece.  Special 
servicers in CMBS face a heavy exposure to commercial real estate markets that is difficult to 
diversify.  The B-piece usually represents about three percent or less of the capital in CMBS 
deals, but bears all of the losses from any loans in the securitization.  The top 10 special servicers 
cover more than 80% of the CMBS market, which totals hundreds of billions of dollars of 
outstanding loan balances.  While CMBS special servicers are experts in assessing and managing 
troubled commercial real estate loans, this expertise may not extend to other types of assets.  
Holding a highly concentrated loss position in every CMBS deal creates the potential for large 
losses in the event of a real estate downturn.  Even worse, new transactions volume in a real 
estate downturn would likely fall, further harming near-term profits and cash-flow.  Finally, 
rating agencies require all servicers to have an above-investment-grade rating in order to perform 
their function, so special servicers must hold a large amount of (costly) capital if they hold the B-
piece on every deal.  Other potential purchasers of low-rated CMBS securities do not face similar 
capital requirements and can better diversify themselves from exposure to commercial real estate. 
The usual CMBS securitization is created by an underwriter that chooses the management 
structure (in conjunction with the rating agencies) and markets the securities to investors.  
Underwriters, usually large banks, want to maximize the profits from each securitization, but 
also want to maintain their reputation for future securitizations.  Underwriters may have 
additional information about loans than investors and the rating agencies, especially since 
underwriters originate many of the loans in their portfolios.  Thus, an underwriter trades-off 8   
possibly lower revenue associated with the special servicer purchasing the B-piece against the 
benefits of better-aligned incentives when the special servicer owns the B-piece.  The 
underwriter should sell the B-piece to the special servicer in circumstances when the incremental 
benefit from a high-powered incentive scheme is especially large. 
The optimal (second-best) compensation scheme employs higher-powered incentive schemes 
when: 1) an agent’s effort has a larger effect on profits, 2) when asymmetric information 
problems make effort more difficult to observe by outsiders, 3) and when agents are less risk-
averse.  Conditions 1 and 2 naturally lead to our first hypothesis: 
H1: The special servicer is more likely to hold the B-piece in deals with (1) a higher expected 
delinquency rate and (2) greater asymmetric information. 
High-powered incentive schemes are more valuable in deals that require greater effort by the 
agents; i.e., in deals with loans that have a higher expected delinquency.  A loan delinquency 
occurs when the borrower is late in making payments or violates one or more terms of the initial 
loan agreement.  Delinquencies are usually unrelated to actions by lenders or servicers.  However, 
effort by the lender or special servicer becomes much more important in handling loans once 
they become delinquent.  Thus it becomes more important to align incentives between the 
principal and the agent in deals with greater potential delinquencies. 
Of course, not all delinquencies are equal.  Agency theory shows that information curbs agent 
opportunism.  (Fama 1980 and Fama and Jensen 1983).  Thus the outcome-based compensation 
is more attractive when the asymmetric information is greater.  We proxy for asymmetric 
information using the extent to which deals differ in realized delinquency rates after controlling 
for observable variables.  Investors are able to assess the risks associated with well-known 9   
quality indicators such as the loan to value ratio (LTV) and the debt service coverage ratio 
(DSCR).  However, when a seemingly high-quality loan (low LTV and high DSCR) gets into 
trouble, investors may have a harder time understanding and predicting the loss recovery.  
Underwriters should be more likely to sell the first-loss position to the special servicer when 
private information about the likelihood of delinquency suggests that a deal will have a higher 
delinquency rate. 
Of course, it is important to examine whether having the special servicer hold the first-loss 
position is effective in alleviating agency problems as theory predicts.  Ideally, we would 
examine the effectiveness of aligning interests by measuring whether investors obtain smaller 
losses when the special servicer owns the B-piece. Unfortunately, we do not observe actual 
losses.  Instead we have data on whether a loan is transferred into special servicing and, 
conditional on special servicing, whether or not a loan is liquidated (either thru foreclosure or the 
special servicer acquiring ownership of the real estate).  We also observe initial prices of 
securities for a small portion of the CMBS deals in our sample, allowing us to see how the 
market values different deal structures.  The combination of these variables allows us to examine 
the efficiency of the special servicer’s actions even without data on monetary losses from default. 
We begin with the first stage of the loan management process:   
H2: Controlling for loan quality, fewer loans will be transferred into costly special servicing 
when the special servicer holds the B-piece. 
As an agent, the special servicer is conflicted.  She receives fees based on the number and dollar 
value of loans that are in special servicing, creating an incentive to transfer more loans into 
special servicing than is optimal from the perspective of the investors.  In addition, the agent 10   
must exert costly effort to determine which loans have severe enough problems to justify the 
additional cost and attention.  Recognizing this conflict, most securitizations have a master 
servicer who oversees each deal.  The master servicer, whose primary function is to monitor the 
timely collection and distribution of principal and interest, must agree with any proposed loan 
transfers into special servicing.  Nonetheless, the special servicer has discretion in deciding 
whether and when to transfer the delinquent loans.  Neither investors nor the master servicer are 
sufficiently well-informed to fully discipline the special servicer.   
If the special servicer owns the first-loss position, she is the residual claimant and thus pays all 
costs associated with transferring loans into special servicing.  In this circumstance, the special 
servicer will choose the first-best solution.  Thus the special servicer should transfer fewer 
delinquent loans into special servicing when she owns the B-piece.  When the special servicer 
does not own the first-loss position, she has incentives to shirk in investigating potentially 
troubled loans and to transfer “too many” loans into costly special servicing to earn higher fees.  
In fact, Fitch, a major rating agency, expressed concern that some special servicers in the 
commercial mortgage securities market unnecessarily transfer assets into special servicing 
(Mortgage Banker Association 10/2/2003).   
Next, we consider the work-out stage when loans are in special servicing.  Special servicers have 
wide discretion on how they handle a troubled loan.  Their options include doing nothing, 
extending the payment period, waiving loan terms, restructuring the loan, possibly forgiving 
some portion of the principal amount, and ultimately foreclosing on the loan and liquidating the 
underlying collateral.  Here we point out that the efficiency of the special servicer’s actions 
depends critically on the size of potential losses in a given CMBS deal.  Thus securitzation does 11   
not align interests as would occur if a single lender owned all of the loans in a securitization and 
made all foreclosure decisions. 
H3A: When potential losses are relatively small, the special servicer will liquidate loans in 
special servicing more quickly when holding the B-piece. 
When the special servicer acts as the agent (as opposed to being the principal when she owns the 
B-piece), we would expect that she will liquidate fewer loans than is optimal for the investors.  
Foreclosure is lengthy and involves costly effort for the special servicer, including intensive 
research in looking for potential buyers, negotiations with sophisticated players, and expensive 
legal procedures.  Ciochetti and Riddiough (1998) report that the average elapsed time from the 
beginning of the foreclosure process to the date at which title to the property is obtained by the 
investor (or is sold by the courthouse) is approximately 9 months.  By postponing this decision, 
the special servicer receives two benefits: she collects additional fees associated with a loan 
spending more time in special servicing and 2) there is some chance that the loan will become 
current without the special servicer exerting any effort.  In the same report mentioned above, 
Fitch expressed concern that some special servicers use “excessive litigation” to retrieve unpaid 
borrower funds, effectively extending the special servicing period.  However, if the loan does not 
become current and has to be liquidated later, the recovery rate in present value terms may be 
lower because owners of severely distressed real estate are likely to take additional risks and to 
postpone necessary capital improvements and renovations.  Therefore, under these conditions, 
the special servicer who does not own the B-piece will be slower to liquidate than is optimal for 
investors and than a single lender would.  Of course, when the special servicer owns the B-piece, 
she pays all of the costs in special servicing out of her own pocket and should make first-best 
decisions.  12   
H3B:  When potential losses are large, a special servicer who owns the B-piece has an additional 
incentive to delay liquidation.  
As potential losses in a given securitization grow, the special servicer faces conflicting incentives.  
At some point, total losses would exceed the value of the B-piece.  As such, when the special 
servicer owns the B-piece and potential losses are large enough, the special servicer might 
optimally choose to extend troubled loans rather than foreclosing and ensuring that the losses 
eliminate the value associated with the B-piece.  (Riddiough 1997)   This is the well-known asset 
substitution problem.  The incentive to extend loans grows with the size of potential losses for 
the B-piece.  A special servicer who does not own the first-loss position faces no such additional 
incentives to extend loans and thus may actually foreclose more quickly than a special servicer 
who owned the B-piece if the deal faces large enough possible losses.  
Finally, we use data on securities prices to measure the effect of incentive alignment on the 
anticipated efficiency of the special servicer’s actions.  Securities prices should reflect the 
benefits of incentive alignment.   
H4:  Securities based on deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece should sell at 
higher prices.  The price effects should be most pronounced for the lowest rated tranches that are 
most likely to suffer losses if the special servicer does not perform efficiently.  
All else equal, if having the special servicer own the B-piece aligns incentives, as we argue 
above, we should expect securities prices to reflect these benefits.  Thus prices should be highest 
for securities in which the special servicer owns the first-loss position.   13   
Of course we should be concerned that we are unable to perfectly observe loan quality and prices 
might reflect factors such as loan quality or deal structure in addition to incentive alignment.  We 
take several steps to address this problem.  First, we examine prices (yields) within a given rating 
class.  Rating agencies are quite concerned about the quality of loans in a pool and their ratings 
directly reflect the impact of loan quality on defaults and losses.  Yet rating agencies do not 
know whether or not the special servicer will eventually own the B-piece (ratings are determined 
at an earlier time period), even as investors know this information when a deal is taken to market.  
Thus investors should be willing to pay a premium for securities of a given ratings class in a deal 
if they think that the special servicer will perform more efficiently relative to another deal in 
which she does not own the B-piece.   
Second, we examine prices within each ratings class.  If deals in which the special servicer owns 
the first-loss position are more attractive for reasons that are unrelated to losses (say these deals 
have better marketing or a superior underwriter), we would expect that prices of all securities in 
these deals would be higher.  Instead, if the reason for differential pricing is optimal effort by the 
special servicer in dealing with delinquencies and defaults, prices of lowest-rated securities--
those with the greatest likelihood of suffering losses due to defaults--should be most impacted by 
whether the special servicer owns the B-piece.   
We address the question of adverse selection in deal quality by examining the ultimate default 
behavior of loans.  We do not directly observe ex-ante loan quality.  An alternative hypothesis 
that might be a concern is that special servicers use their superior knowledge of loan quality such 
that they only choose to purchase the B-piece in deals in which their private information says 
that loans are above-average quality.  Fortunately, such an alternative hypothesis is testable in 
the data.  If adverse selection were an important feature of this market, we would expect that, 14   
conditional on observable data, deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece would have 
better-than-average delinquency and default experience.  We reject this hypothesis in the data 
that follows. 
III.   Data 
The data for this study comes from two main sources: Trepp Data Feed and Commercial 
Mortgage Alert (CMA) CMBS Data.  Trepp is the leading data provider in commercial 
mortgage-backed securities and is used by most major investors in the CMBS market.  Trepp 
Data Feed consists of four separate files: a property file, a loan file, a deal file, and a bond file.  
Each file includes annual, end-of-year performance data, including cash flow, for all properties, 
loans, deals, and bonds.  We obtain a number of important variables from Trepp, including loan 
delinquency status, the date on which a loan was transferred to the special servicer, the date on 
which a loan was returned back to the master servicer, the date on which a loan was foreclosed 
or transferred to REO (Real Estate Owned by the special servicer), the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), 
and debt service coverage ratio (DSCR).  The DSCR is the ratio of property cash flow to total 
debt payments.  Thus a ratio of 1.25 implies that property cash flow is 1.25x required debt 
service payments, or that property cash flow could fall by 20% and still allow the debtor to cover 
his loan payments from existing cash flow. 
CMA is a weekly newsletter.  It provides historical data on all new CMBS issuances and the 
initial prices of many bonds sold to investors at the time of the securitization. CMA lists the 
owner’s name for many junior pieces
10, enabling us to identify the most important variable in our 
analysis: whether the special servicer (SPS) owns the B-piece.  Initial bond prices include the 
                                                 
10 There is no such as data field “B-piece buyer” in the data base itself. However, there is a short paragraph note for 
each deal and in many deals the B-piece buyer’s name is listed. We add this field by going over all the notes. 15   
yield and spread over benchmark for all tranches that are publicly placed at the time of the initial 
securitization.  Unfortunately, we are unable to obtain consistent pricing information for 
securities once the initial sale of securities takes place. 
The Trepp data consists of an unbalanced panel of 839 deals with up to six years of observations 
(1998-2003), depending on when the deal was originated.  We merge the files from Trepp and 
CMA by issuer name and serial number, successfully matching 702 of the 839 deals.  Of these 
702 deals, 588 have the name of the special servicer and 360 have B-piece ownership.  Overall, 
our final sample has 357 deals (with 46,492 loans) that have both the B-piece ownership and 
special servicer information.  Table 1 lists these deals by the year that the deal closed.  In recent 
years, the average deal size has varied between $786 million and $1,164 million, while the 
average number of loans per deal ranges from 105 to 232.  Total CMBS issuance peaked in 1998 
and again in 2003 at the end of our sample.   
Table 2 summarizes the percentage of deals that the special servicer owns the B-piece for all 
fifteen special servicers that service at least 5 deals in our sample.  These special servicers 
manage deals that account for 89% of the number of deals and 92% of the loan balances in our 
sample, suggesting that the special servicing industry is moderately concentrated.  Among the 
317 deals that these special servicers manage, the special servicer owns the B-piece in 203 (64%) 
deals.  Although most special servicers own the B-piece in at least some portion of their deals, 
some special servicers show a strong “preference” for one type of structure or the other.  This 
fact is especially true for the top 6 special servicers.  We include special servicer dummies in all 
default and delinquency specifications to control for possible differences in preferences or 
expertise across special servicers. 16   
IV.   Results 
A. When do special servicers hold the B-piece? (Hypothesis H1) 
We begin by comparing the characteristics of deals based on whether or not the special servicer 
holds the B-piece (Table 3).  The results are clearly consistent with our first hypothesis, H1.  Ex-
ante observable characteristics do not vary economically or statistically in deals based on 
whether the special servicer holds the B-piece.  We examine the most commonly used measures 
of deal size or performance: loan balances, number of loans, LTV, DSCR, Weighted Average 
Coupon (WAC), and AAA subordination (percentage of the deal that is rated AAA by the rating 
agencies).   
Yet, ex-poste, the deals in which the special servicer owns the low-rated tranche have 
appreciably higher delinquency rates.  For delinquencies of greater than 30 days, these 
differences are statistically significant at the 5% level.  Note that delinquency is a relatively 
objective measure of a troubled loan, with delinquencies typically being triggered by late 
payments or in some cases, cash flow falling to very low levels.  Effort by the special servicer 
should have little effect on a loan becoming delinquent.  This evidence also suggests that special 
servicers do not have superior information relative to the underwriter that allows them to 
“cherry-pick” (purchase) the B-piece in only the best (unobserved) quality deals.  
Of course, these are just unconditional means.  To systematically explore this point, we examine 
the likelihood of delinquency in a deal in year t conditional on observable information in year t-1.  
The results are presented in Table 4.  The dependent variable is the delinquency rate for each 
deal; that is, the ratio of the outstanding balance of loans in delinquency to the total outstanding 
of balances for the deal.  Explanatory variables include measures of observable quality (LTV, 17   
DSCR, controls for different property types), year dummy variables, and whether the special 
servicer (SPS) owns the B-piece.   
In all specifications, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that the special servicer 
owns the B-piece is positive and statistically significant at conventional confidence levels, 
implying that special servicers hold the B-piece in lower quality deals, after controlling for 
observable characteristics.  Investors almost surely have a difficult time monitoring 
delinquencies that are uncorrelated with observable measures of quality such as DSCR and LTV.   
Other coefficients in the regression are either insignificant or have the expected sign.  The lack 
of importance of LTV in predicting delinquency is not surprising given that originators and 
underwriters have more information than these characteristics and should be expected to use this 
information when deciding which loans to include in a pool.
11  High LTV loans in the pool may 
have other hard-to-measure attributes indicating that such loans face a lower delinquency or 
default rate.  (e.g., the property that serves as collateral for a high LTV loan may have a long-
term lease with a credit-quality tenant.)  The simultaneity of many loan and pool characteristics 
just highlights the importance of unobserved quality in this market and thus the important role of 
servicers in managing loan delinquencies and defaults. 
Other columns provide additional controls to ensure that our results are not driven by functional 
form.  To account for the strong non-linearity in the effects of LTV and DSCR, we use dummy 
variables instead of the numerical values in columns 2, 4, and 6.  In the first two columns, we 
                                                 
11 Archer, Elmer, Harrison and Ling (2002) argue for the endogeneity in commercial mortgage underwriting in 
terms of LTV ratio, which would imply no empirical relationship between default and LTV because lender would 
require lower LTVs for high risk mortgages. They examine 495 multifamily mortgages securitized by the Resolution 
Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and find no evidence of LTV effect 
on default. 18   
include only a sparse set of covariates, including whether the special servicer owns the B-piece, 
LTV, and DSCR.  Columns 3 and 4 add year dummies and property type controls.   
Most strikingly, the last two columns include dummy variables for each special servicer and thus 
rely on variation in deals for individual special servicers based on whether or not they own the 
B-piece.  Despite the potential loss of variation, the coefficient on whether the special servicer 
owns the B-piece rises in magnitude. 
The results in this sub-section are consistent with hypothesis H1.  Deals in which the special 
servicer holds the B-piece are more likely to be delinquent, but do not differ on observable 
characteristics.  This finding is consistent with our expectation that an underwriter who has 
superior information on the true quality of deals will choose to align incentives through having 
the special servicer own the B-piece in deals with a higher expected delinquency rate. 
B. Agency conflicts in transferring loans to special servicing (H2) 
Next, we investigate whether holding the B-piece mitigates agency problems by examining when 
the special servicer transfers loans to special servicing.  Special servicing is costly.  Hypothesis 
H2 predicts that the special servicer will be less likely to transfer a delinquent loan to special 
servicing when she owns the B-piece for two reasons: first, she exerts more effort in identifying 
the right loans to transfer; and second, the special servicer is the residual claimant and thus she 
does not benefit from additional fees paid while loans are in special servicing.  Table 5 reports 
the results of a probit model in which the dependent variable equals one when a delinquent loan 
is transferred to special servicing within certain period of time.  Independent variables are 
whether the special servicer owns the B-piece and other explanatory variables.  We examine 
transfers of delinquent loans that occur between two and six months after delinquency.   19   
The estimated coefficients on the dummy variable indicating that the special servicer owns the 
B-piece are negative and highly significantly different from zero.  The coefficients are large, 
suggesting a 7.5 to 13.8 percent lower likelihood of transferring loans into special servicing 
when the special servicer owns the most junior tranche.  As the time period for action gets longer 
and special servicers have time to investigate troubled loans, the coefficient on special servicer 
owning the B-piece grows in magnitude.  Industry analysts suggest that low cash flow (low debt 
service coverage ratio) is the most troubling indicator of eventual default so, not surprisingly, 
low DSCR loans are more likely to be transferred into special servicing.  The negative 
coefficient on high LTV loans is a bit surprising.  For seasoned loans, however, true property 
value is usually hard to measure, unlike cash flow.  These findings confirm our prediction that 
the alignment of interests helps to alleviate the agency problem at the transfer stage. 
C. Agency conflicts in working out troubled loans (H3A and H3B) 
Once a loan reaches the special servicing stage, the special servicer must now exert additional 
effort to quickly and accurately decide how to manage the troubled loans.  Her choices include: 1) 
acquiring the property from the borrower through the foreclosure or bankruptcy process and 
liquidating the asset or 2) negotiating with the existing borrower, possibly extending the loan, 
lowering the interest rate, and/or writing down a portion of the loan principal.  As discussed in 
Section II, we expect that the alignment of interests will cause the special servicer to liquidate 
sooner under ordinary circumstances (Hypothesis H3A).  Delaying action allows the special 
servicer to avoid exerting costly effort in identifying loans that are good candidates for 
liquidation as well as earn additional fees when loans spend a longer time in special servicing.  In 
addition, a longer liquidation process is often costly for loan investors because collateral values 
can decline rapidly over time, as property owners typically cut back on maintenance and take 20   
additional risk on highly-leveraged properties.  When the special servicer is the residual claimant 
as owner of the B-piece, she internalizes these costs and has incentives to act more quickly.  
However, as a larger percentage of the loans in a deal get in trouble, the likelihood grows that 
potential losses will exceed the size of the junior piece.  At that point, having the special servicer 
own the B-piece creates conflicts between the junior and senior securities holders.  As potential 
losses grow, a special servicer who also holds the junior piece may choose to delay liquidation in 
the hope that property cash flow or values will rise (Hypothesis H3B). 
In  Table 6, we run a probit regression estimating the likelihood that a loan is liquidated within a 
fixed period of time--6 months or a year.  We define a property as being liquidated if the records 
indicate a foreclosure, a REO transaction, or a bankruptcy.  As in other regressions, we control 
for other observable quality variables, including LTV, DSCR, deal type dummies, property type 
dummies, dummy variables for origination year, and special servicer dummies.  As predicted, 
loans in deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece are between three and five percent 
more likely to be liquidated within six months or a year, a result that is statistically significant 
with at least 90 percent confidence in all specifications.  As before, the magnitude of the 
coefficients rises when we include special servicer dummy variables, although the standard error 
increases as well.  These results suggest that a given special servicer behaves differently 
depending on whether she owns the B-piece, a strong indication that agency conflicts are 
important in this market. 
The coefficients on other controls are consistent with expectations.  LTV has a positive 
coefficient, consistent with previous literature.  Specifications using dummy variables for LTV 
instead of the continuous value show that the main impact of LTV is for loans with an LTV 21   
higher than 80%.  The coefficients on DSCR have the expected negative sign, although they are 
significant only in columns 4 to 6. 
Next we examine whether the special servicer’s actions change when the percentage of seriously 
delinquent loans rises in a pool.  We define the extent to which a deal faces serious delinquency 
based on whether the sum of all delinquent loan balances in a deal exceeds various thresholds.  
We include the measure of serious delinquency in the regression directly, as well as including an 
interaction term between this dummy variable and whether the special servicer owns the B-piece.  
We expect the interaction term to be negative if conflicts between securities holders are material 
in seriously delinquent deals. 
Table 7 presents evidence of conflicts between senior and junior tranches when a deal gets into 
serious trouble (H3B).  The coefficient on the interaction term denoting that a deal has serious 
delinquencies and the special servicer owns the most junior tranche is negative and statistically 
different from zero with at least 93 percent confidence in all specifications.  The coefficient on 
whether the special servicer owns the B-piece is positive and statistically significant.  Putting 
these two coefficients together suggests that special servicers who own the first-loss position act 
differently when aggregate potential losses rise.  For deals with a relatively small percentage 
delinquent loans, the special servicer liquidates more quickly when she owns the most junior 
tranche.  Yet when the percentage of delinquencies rises, the special servicer appears to delay 
liquidation.  The coefficient on the dummy for serious delinquency is also positive and 
significant in most columns, suggesting either that the special servicer becomes more aggressive 
when many loans in a deal are in serious trouble, possibly due to concern with reputation, or that 
unobserved quality is worse when many loans in a deal get in trouble. 22   
D.  Unobserved quality for deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece   
Lower transfer rates into special servicing and higher liquidation rates once in special servicing 
for deals with small potential losses in which the special servicer owns the B-piece are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the special servicer exerts more effort in identifying the right loans to 
transfer.  Yet we are still concerned that deals may differ in unobserved quality in ways that 
might bias at least some of our findings.  In particular, we are concerned that the special servicer 
might own deals with higher unobserved quality loans.  Table 2 shows that the special servicer 
owns the B-piece in deals with a higher delinquency rate.  Now we examine liquidation, 
conditional on delinquency.  By conditioning on delinquency rather than special servicing, we 
remove the impact any actions taken by the special servicer in special servicing.  If the exertion 
of the effort is the only reason for differences in the timing of liquidation, we would expect that 
the eventual liquidation of loans would be similar whether or not the special servicer owns the B-
piece. 
The results, presented in Table 8, show that, conditional on delinquency, liquidation rates are 
higher, not lower, for deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece.  Thus, if anything, 
deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece have worse unobserved quality.  This 
suggests that the special servicer is especially accurate when referring loans to special servicing 
when she owns the B-piece.  However, these findings are statistically different from zero in the 
first two columns based on whether a delinquent loan is liquidated in 6 months.  In the last two 
columns, when we examine liquidation within one year, the coefficients drop in half and are not 
significantly different from zero.  As above, these findings suggest that the special servicer 
handles additional delinquencies more quickly when she owns the B-piece. 23   
E.  Market prices of securities and agency conflicts (H4) 
Finally, we take advantage of initial bond pricing data from CMA to examine whether bond 
investors pay a premium for deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece.  The reasoning 
is straightforward: if there is value created from this incentive enhancing structure, the market 
should require lower yield in deals with this structure than in deals in which the special servicer 
does not own the B-piece, ceteris paribus.  This finding would be especially striking given that 
deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece have higher delinquency and liquidation 
rates. 
In the regressions, we examine spreads within each bond rating class.  Controlling for bond 
ratings provides for an alternative way of dealing with the issue of unobserved quality.  After all, 
the ratings agency’s primary role is to provide a more informed view about default probabilities.  
Discussions with the rating agencies confirm that while collateral quality and capital for special 
servicers are critical in determining bond ratings, they do not consider whether the special 
servicer owns the B-piece.  In part, rating agencies do not know this information when they 
determine bond ratings, which must occur prior to the actual sale of the bonds.  Also, ownership 
data on bonds is not available for all deals and there is often no guarantee that the special 
servicer will maintain ownership of the B-piece.  Of course, selling the B-piece after a deal has 
gone public is likely quite difficult given the information asymmetry between the special servicer 
and any potential buyers of the first-loss position. 
Hypothesis H4 predicts that investors should be willing to pay a premium for bonds in deals in 
which the special servicer owns the lowest rated tranche and that this premium should be most 
pronounced for the lowest rated tranches that face the greatest risk of losses.  Regression results 24   
in Table 9 are consistent with this hypothesis.  The dependent variable is the spread over the 
benchmark yield as reported in the CMA pricing data set (measured in basis points, or 0.01%).  
In addition to whether the special servicer owns the most junior tranche, we include a complete 
set of dummy variables for each bond ratings category and year and quarter dummies.  Since 
most of the deals are rated by more than one rating agency, we use the best rating from among all 
ratings.
12  We also restrict the sample to bonds which have a fixed rate and thus are easier to 
evaluate.  This cuts our sample of bonds by about 10 percent. 
With all bonds (column 1), the coefficient on the special servicer owning the B-piece is negative 
and fairly small (about 8 basis points), and also not statistically different from zero at 
conventional confidence levels.  However, these regressions include all rated tranches, while 
most of the benefits associated with the special servicer owning the B-piece go to the junior 
security holders who bear most of the credit risk.  (Note: As of the date on this draft, there have 
never been any losses to CMBS securities with investment-grade ratings of BBB or above.) 
In column 2, we examine only the tranches with non-investment-grade ratings (below BBB-).  
The sample drops appreciably to 78 observations.  Most junior pieces are privately placed and 
are not publicly priced, so the regression sample mainly consists of senior tranches.  For example, 
almost 97% of all tranches in our data have investment-grade ratings.  Nonetheless, the 
coefficient on deals in which the special servicer owns the B-piece becomes much more negative 
and is highly statistically significant.  In the bottom row of the table, we list the average spread 
for each regression sample.  When all the tranches are included, the average effect of aligning the 
interests is fairly small, because the majority of tranches are senior securities that bear very little 
                                                 
12 Previous versions of the paper also reported results that used the worst rating among all ratings assigned and 
results that included adjustable rate securities.  Coefficient estimates and standard errors were similar, although they 
varied across specification.  Results are available upon request. 25   
credit risk.  When focusing only on the tranches with below investment-grade ratings in column 
2, the estimated effects are much larger in magnitude.  For the lowest rated tranches, the 
evidence suggests that the underwriter is able to sell securities at a spread that is 29% percent 
lower when the special servicer holds the B-piece. 
These findings are consistent with underwriters facing a tradeoff in which they are able to sell 
securities at a lower yield when the special servicer owns the B-piece, but that the special 
servicer requires a premium to be willing to hold the B-piece.   
 
V. Conclusion 
The asset-backed securities market has exploded in recent years.  Benefits of ABS include 
completing the market for securities, enhanced liquidity, transparency, and specialization. 
Nonetheless, this paper demonstrates that securitization also involves potentially serious moral 
hazard and agency conflicts associated with the separation of ownership and control of assets and 
conflicts of interest between junior and senior securities holders.  These conflicts are similar to 
those faced by firms that finance with equity and debt, but are more pronounced given the large 
number of debt tranches in most ABS securitizations and the stricter priority claims that are 
enforced by courts in securitizations.  Our findings suggest that securitization results in a second-
best solution in dealing with troubled loans relative to a situation in which there is a single entity 
that owns a whole loan and manages potential delinquencies and defaults.  The special servicer, 
the agent in charge of the workout strategy for delinquent assets, may not always behave in the 
best interests of security holders.  To curb the agency problem, the special servicer often holds 
the most junior tranche (the so-called B-piece). 26   
Using data on 357 CMBS deals involving over 46,000 loans, we find that the special servicer 
holds the B-piece in worse quality deals, with a greater percentage of realized delinquencies and 
liquidations after controlling for observable loan and deal attributes.  Thus underwriters who 
have superior information appear to mitigate information asymmetries between investors and 
managers (special servicers) by aligning ownership and control in deals where this structure is 
most valuable.  The special servicer appears to behave more efficiently in most situations when 
she owns the B-piece, transferring a smaller percentage of delinquent loans to costly special 
servicing and liquidating troubled loans more quickly.  The market recognizes these benefits;  
spreads for non-investment grade bonds are 29 percent lower in deals in which the special 
servicer owns the B-piece. All of these findings are consistent with the predictions of agency 
theory.   
However, the structure is not flawless.  When deals face a larger percentage of delinquent loans, 
a special servicer who is also the B-piece holder reverses behavior by delaying liquidation, 
possibly because the downside loss can be shared with senior security holders. Together, these 
results show that securitization involves tradeoffs that may lead to a second-best outcome when 
handling troubled loans.   
These findings still leave a large remaining unresolved puzzle: why doesn’t the special servicer 
purchase the B-piece in all deals.  After all, as the most informed party and the party in control of 
most decisions, the special servicer should have the highest willingness-to-pay.  We provide two 
potential answers.  First, the underwriter (and other investors) may be wary of the asset 
substitution problem.  To the extent that special servicers delay liquidation when they suffer 
larger losses in a pool, the special servicer’s high willingness-to-pay may be more than offset by 
expected losses in value for other tranches.  Nonetheless, our bond pricing results suggest asset 27   
substitution is not a big concern, at least during a time when real estate markets have been strong 
and losses low.  
A second potential explanation is that special servicers may be more risk averse than other 
investors, which may offset their potentially higher valuation for the B-piece.  Special servicers 
in the CMBS market have unique skills that limit their ability to diversify into other areas.  In 
addition, special servicers must hold capital and retain strong credit ratings in order to remain in 
business.  Times when losses in existing CMBS securities are high may also correspond to times 
when profits from future deals may fall if credit if investors are wary of making new loans. Of 
special interest to this analysis, Figure 1 compares aggregate issuance to the percentage of deals 
in which the special servicer owns the B-piece.  The percentage of deals in which the special 
servicer owns the B-piece in a given year (measured by either by dollars or number of deals) 
appears inversely related to the total issuance of CMBS securities.  This observation is consistent 
with the view that special servicers face a tradeoff between their exposure to CMBS risk and the 
extent to which special servicers own the B-piece, although with eight years of aggregate data, 
this analysis is hardly definitive. 
From a policy perspective, our finding that having the special servicer own the B-piece alleviates 
agency and moral hazard conflicts only when delinquency rates in a pool are relatively low is 
also a potential warning.  Regulations for insurance companies and new risk-based capital 
requirements for banks allow institutions to hold less capital to protect against losses in securities 
than for losses in whole loans.  Yet we still do not know how the ABS market would perform in 
a recession with appreciable declines in asset values.  Our results surely do not generalize to such 
a situation.  The recent growth in the private ABS market does not provide the data to address 
this question.  Nonetheless, this is an issue that is worthy of additional attention as regulated 28   
institutions rely more heavily on rated ABS securities to fund future lending activities.29   
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 Table 1 Summary of CMBS Deals by Closing Year 
 
This table lists all the deals in the final sample by closing year. The third-fifth columns 
summarize the number and percentage of deals based on whether or not the special servicer (SPS) 

























1993  1 1  0  100% $21 $21  197 
1994 4  2  2  50%  $1,110 $278  90 
1995 18  8  10  44%  $5,260  $292  80 
1996 25  20  5  80%  $11,100 $442  140 
1997 31  24  7  77%  $24,700 $796  145 
1998 43  27  16  63%  $50,100  $1,164  210 
1999 43  21  22  49%  $39,800 $925  232 
2000 53  33  20  62%  $41,600 $786  130 
2001 47  25  22  53%  $39,600 $842  124 
2002 44  32  12  73%  $37,700 $858  105 
2003 48  28  20  58%  $51,300  $1,069  106 
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Table 2 Summary of Deals by each Special Servicer 
This table summarizes deals by the name of each special servicer (SPS). Only special servicers 
with at least 5 deals are included. This table includes 89% (92%) of the number of deals (cutoff 
loan balance) in the final sample. 
 
Special 




# of Deals in 
which SPS  
Holds B-piece 
# of Deals in 
which SPS Not 
Hold B-piece 
Lennar 80  $74,600  64  16 
GMAC 67  $53,600  55  12 
Midland 33  $27,800  2  31 
Orix 25  $22,800  4  21 
Criimi Mae  24  $23,700  23  1 
ARCap 18  $20,500  16  2 
Banc One  14  $13,200  6  8 
Lend Lease  11  $10,100  7  4 
Amresco 10  $9,430 8  2 
Clarion 7  $6,850  6  1 
J.E. Robert  7  $2,450  5  2 
GE Capital  6  $3,260  5  1 
First Union  5  $5,370  1  4 
Gespa 5  $1,740  0  5 
Wells Fargo  5  $3,590  1  4 
Total  317 $278,990  203  114 
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Table 3 Comparison of Deals Based on Whether the Special Servicer Holds the B-piece 
This table compares some basic characteristics of deals in which the special servicer (SPS) 
holds the B-piece or does not hold the B-piece. The fourth column presents t-statistics for the 
test of whether the means of each variable are equal in columns 2 and 3.  All delinquency 
measures are the percentage of outstanding balance of delinquent loans over outstanding 
balance of all loans in a deal. 
 
  
Deals in which SPS 
Does Not 
Hold B-piece 
Deals in which 




Balance ($mil)  $819  $864  -0.84 
Number of Loans  128  154  -1.38 
Loan-to-Value Percent  67.1%  66.4%  -1.01 
Debt Service Coverage 
Ratio 1.59  1.57  0.28 
Weighted Average 
Coupon yield  7.58%  7.72%  1.02 
AAA Subordination 
Level 23.4%  22.2%  1.33 
Pct. of Loans more than 
30 days delinquent  0.25%  0.34%  -1.02 
Pct. of Loans more than 
60 days delinquent  0.09%  0.19%  -1.90 
Pct. of Loans more than 
90 days delinquent  0.39%  0.74%  -1.95 
Pct. of Loans with any 
delinquency 0.73%  1.95%  -2.21 
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Table 4 Delinquency Regressions 
This table presents the results from regressing the delinquency rate in year t on explanatory 
variables in the previous year (t-1).  Estimates control for correlation across years within each 
deal and heteroskedasity. 
Dependent variable: Percentage of Loan Balance in a Deal that is Delinquent 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SPS  owns  B-piece 0.92  0.94  0.81 0.82 1.09 1.02 
 [2.86]**  [2.90]**  [2.40]** [2.52]** [2.07]** [2.13]**
Loan-to-Value  -0.035    -0.047  -0.044  
  [0.53]    [0.60]  [0.61]  
DSCR  -1.77    -2.44  -1.67  
  [1.66]*  [1.75]*   [1.32]  
LTV is 0.60 to 0.80    -0.34    0.25    -0.03 
    [0.25]   [0.16]  [0.02] 
LTV > 0.80    -1.12    -2.33    -1.77 
    [0.75]   [1.16]  [1.00] 
DSCR < 1.2    1.50    0.66    -1.00 
    [0.92]   [0.47]  [0.64] 
DSCR is 1.2 to 1.6    0.49    0.73    0.52 
    [1.22]   [1.58]  [0.98] 
Pct fixed rate loans      -0.016  -0.017  -0.004  -0.004 
      [1.30] [1.62] [0.26] [0.26] 
Constant  6.06  0.96 10.27  3.05 8.34 2.64 
 [1.06]  [0.89]  [1.39]  [2.10]** [1.36] [1.74]* 
Prop  Type  Controls      Y Y Y Y 
Year  Dummy  Vars      Y Y Y Y 
SPS Dummy Vars          Y  Y 
Observations  895  895  895 895 895 895 
R-squared  0.02 0.01 0.11 0.1 0.15  0.15 35   
Table 5 Transfer to Special Servicing Conditional on Delinquency 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a delinquent loan was transferred 
to special servicing in a given number of months and 0 otherwise. The table reports partial 
effects.  Estimates control for correlation across years within each deal and heteroskedasity.  
 
  Transfer to Special Servicing within: 
   2 Months  3 Months  4 Months  5 Months  6 Months 
SPS owns B-piece  -0.092  -0.075  -0.131  -0.125  -0.138 
 [2.43]**  [1.62]  [2.53]** [2.43]**  [2.60]** 
LTV is .60 to .80  0.02  0.01  0.036  0.036  0.048 
 [0.64]  [0.28]  [0.88]  [0.89]  [1.16] 
LTV > 80  -0.043  -0.107  -0.156  -0.155  -0.158 
 [1.12]  [2.35]**  [3.15]** [3.11]**  [3.12]** 
DSCR < 1.2  0.06  0.06  0.12  0.11  0.12 
 [1.82]*  [1.59]  [2.90]** [2.76]**  [2.81]** 
DSCR is 1.2 to 1.6  -0.003  -0.012  0.005  0.004  0.004 
 [0.11]  [0.34]  [0.13]  [0.11]  [0.10] 
Deal Type Dummy  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Property Type Dummy  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year Dummy  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
SPS Dummy  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 1,327  1,329  1,342  1,342  1,342 
Pseudo-R square  0.056  0.059  0.067  0.067  0.075 36   
 Table 6 Liquidation Conditional on Special Servicing 
Estimates control for correlation across loans within each deal and heteroskedasticity. The table 
reports partial effects. 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy that equals to 1 if a loan was liquidated (default) in 6 months (or 1 
year) after transfer to special servicing and 0 otherwise 
  
Liquidated 
in 6 Months 
Liquidated 
in 1 Year 
SPS  owns  B-piece  0.03  0.031 0.032 0.051 0.052 0.059 
 [2.54]**  [2.65]**  [1.70]*  [2.66]** [2.71]***  [1.84]* 
Loan-to-Value  0.002    0.003    
  [7.08]**    [6.46]**    
DSCR  -0.004     -0.03    
  [0.35]     [1.99]**    
LTV is .60 to .80    -0.015  -0.017    -0.026  -0.025 
   [0.79]  [0.88]  [0.96]  [0.86] 
LTV  >  80   0.139  0.139  0.197  0.198 
   [4.67]**  [4.59]**  [5.05]**  [4.83]** 
DSCR  <  1.2   0.013  0.017  0.068  0.068 
   [0.73]  [0.94]   [2.43]**  [2.35]** 
DSCR is 1.2 to 1.6    0.003  0.003    0.061  0.046 
   [0.15]  [0.17]   [2.28]**  [1.66]* 
Deal  Type  Dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Property Type 
Dummy  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year  Dummy  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SPS  Dummy     Y    Y 
Observations  1,532 1,532 1,372 1,532 1,532 1,372 
Pseudo-R  square  0.111 0.122 0.142 0.088 0.094 0.121 
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Table 7 Liquidation Conditional on Special Servicing for Serious Delinquent Deals 
 
Serious delinquency equals 1 if there are more than X% of the deal in delinquency and 0 
otherwise. The regressions also include an interaction term of SPS owns B-piece and deal is 
seriously delinquent. Estimates control for correlation across loans within each deal and 
heteroskedasity. The table reports partial effects. 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy that equals to 1 if a loan was liquidated in the 6 months after 
transfer to special servicing and 0 otherwise. 
  Level of Serious Delinquency (pct of deal that is delinquent) 
    >2% >3% >4% >5% >6% 
SPS  owns  B-piece  0.036 0.040 0.042 0.040 0.041 
 [1.85]*  [2.16]**  [2.25]** [2.17]** [2.17]** 
(SPS owns B-piece)* 
(Deal is seriously Dlq)  -0.050 -0.068 -0.068 -0.064 -0.063 
  [2.02]** [2.56]** [2.75]** [2.90]** [2.45]** 
Deal is Seriously  
Delinquent  0.083 0.124 0.129 0.173 0.222 
  [2.97]** [2.55]** [2.57]** [3.10]** [2.52]** 
LTV is .60 to .80  -0.016  -0.014  -0.014  -0.014  -0.016 
  [0.89] [0.77] [0.77] [0.77] [0.85] 
LTV  >  .80  0.138 0.140 0.139 0.139 0.142 
  [4.74]** [4.71]** [4.71]** [4.69]** [4.69]** 
DSCR<1.2  0.014 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.014 
  [0.84] [0.93] [0.92] [0.97] [0.80] 
DSCR is 1.2 to 1.6  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.000 
  [0.13] [0.14] [0.12] [0.14] [0.02] 
Deal  Type  Dummy  Y Y Y Y Y 
Property  Type  Dummy  Y Y Y Y Y 
Year  Dummy  Y Y Y Y Y 
SPS  Dummy  Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1,372 1,372 1,372 1,372 1,372 
Pseudo-R  square  0.1521 0.1504 0.1511 0.1529 0.1479 38   
 Table 8  Liquidation Conditional on Delinquency 
Estimates control for correlation across loans within each deal and heteroskedasity. The table 
reports partial effects.   
Dependent variable: Dummy that equals to 1 if a loan was liquidated in 6 months (or 1 year) 
after the date on which the loan was recorded as in delinquency and 0 otherwise. 
   Liquidate in 6 Months  Liquidate in 1 Year 
SPS owns B-piece  0.53  0.54  0.26  0.27 
 [2.37]**  [2.36]**  [1.28]  [1.32] 
Loan-to-Value 0.01    0.006   
 [3.42]**    [1.95]*   
DSCR 0.033    -0.035   
 [0.37]    [0.41]   
LTV is .60 to .80    -0.034    -0.136 
   [0.20]    [0.95] 
LTV > .80    0.53    0.24 
   [2.73]**    [1.39] 
DSCR < 1.2    -0.029    0.08 
   [0.16]    [0.49] 
DSCR is 1.2 to 1.6    0.00    0.13 
   [0.00]    [0.84] 
Constant -2.26  -1.75  -1.85  -1.44 
 [2.77]**  [2.17]**  [2.28]**  [1.82]* 
Property Type Dummy  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year Dummy  Y  Y  Y  Y 
SPS Dummy  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 1,301  1,301  1,332  1,332 
Pseudo-R square  0.1453  0.1523  0.1749  0.1788 
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Table 9 Initial Bond Pricing Regression 
Dependent variable: The spread over benchmark (basis points, or .01%) 
  All bonds  Bonds rated BB or less 
   (1)  (2) 
SPS owns B-piece  -8.2  -136.7 
 [1.28]  [3.46]** 
AA+ 17.5   
 [3.64]**   
AA 18.5   
 [12.32]**   
AA- 22.2   
 [10.36]**   
A+ 25.5   
 [7.22]**   
A 37.9   
 [20.98]**   
A- 41.5   
 [18.26]**   
BBB+ 74.5   
 [25.51]**   
BBB 95.4   
 [30.37]**   
BBB- 144   
 [35.83]**   
BB+ 263   
 [8.49]**   
BB 263  49.3 
 [12.68]**  [3.05]** 
BB- 280  111 
 [7.04]**  [5.25]** 
B+ 525  261 
 [5.88]**  [6.00]** 
B 550  295 
 [15.94]**  [12.88]** 
B- 741  503 
 [12.79]**  [22.96]** 
CCC 1,758  1,418 
 [31.87]**  [22.62]** 
Constant 132  667 
 [8.19]**  [9.79]** 
Observations 2,271  78 
R-squared 0.85 0.99 
Average Spread  123.1  474.3 
Estimates control for correlation across tranches in each deal and heteroskedasity.  Regressions 
contain year and quarter dummies.  Sample includes only fixed-rate bonds. 40   
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The top (bottom) figure shows the total issuance versus the percentage of deals in which the SPS 
holds the B-piece measured by number of deals (issue size in U.S. $) in our final sample. Total 
issuance is in million U.S. dollars. 
 
 